  Observatorio da
política china / Observatorio de la política
china 
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| The new Taiwan policy Por Xulio Ríos (igadi.org, 20/11/2005) |
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The defeat of the Kuomintang (KMT) in the presidential elections of 2000 to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Chen Shui-bian, confirmed a shift in Beijing’s strategy of dialogue that had collapsed the year before when the then-president Lee Teng-hui showed himself to be in favour of relations between Beijing and Taipei being channelled under a “State to State” formula. Authorities on the mainland trusted that the independence movement would not grow any stronger. After all, Chen’s triumph would not have been possible without the division inside the KMT, which ran in the elections burdened by its third large split, that of the People First Party (PFP), founded by James Soong (previously the New Party –NP– and the Taiwan Solidarity Union –TSU– had left the KMT). China thought at the time that simply waiting for the opposition to find ways to join forces with each other would be enough to cause DPP to lose power. These hopes appeared to be well founded when the PFP and the KMT announced they had reached an agreement to run on a joint ticket in the 2004 presidential elections. However, once again Chen’s DPP managed, albeit by a very small margin, to win, -receiving a million and a half votes more than those obtained in 2000- and his reform programme, including ideas for constitutional reform, caused great concern in China. At this point, passivity and the usual rhetoric of condemnation had to give way to a much more active policy, which was implemented in four main spheres: the legislative, political, economic and diplomatic arenas. The passing of this law marks a turning point in the policy of Beijing, comparable to the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” (1979), or the “eight points” of Jiang Zemin (1995). Passed unanimously in the Permanent Committee of the National Popular Assembly (NPA) held on the 29th of December, 2004, it received final approval on the 14th of March, 2005, during the third session of the 10th NPA, with only two abstentions and 2896 votes in favour by the delegates present. The Anti-Secession Law basically codifies the traditional principles of the policy of mainland China on this matter: there is only one China, re-unification is a national task and if Taiwan does not co-operate willingly, then China will be forced to take the matter into its own hands, as China has self-imposed the obligation to resort to any means, including violent ones, to avoid a hypothetical independence. The text mentions that a high degree of autonomy is reserved for Taiwan, but avoids the “one country, two systems” formula that has been the basis for the reunification processes of Hong Kong and Macao. The Law did not seem to come at a good time, but Chinese political machinery works at its own pace. What could have been more comprehensible when Chen Shui-bian was elected president a second time, in March 2004, caught up in a pre-election attack, a dark episode that was only recently closed, and by a narrow margin of votes, in the midst of announcements about officially changing the name of the Republic of China to Taiwan, and proclamations about a new Constitution, etc., a year after all that the enactment of the Law seems, though understandable, at the very least, untimely. Essentially there are three conditions which would obligate China to take forceful measures against Taiwan: a formal proclamation of independence, indefinite refusal to open negotiations on unification, and interference by third parties that jeopardizes China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In Taiwan, the reactions to this initiative have been varied. The principal opposition has been led by the government of Taipei and the parties that support it, while the party in opposition to the Taipei government, the winner of the legislative elections of December 2004, made calls for moderation and dialogue. In the three months before the final passing of this legal text, the government of Taipei worked intensely to denounce it, both at home and abroad, based on two main issues. First, the law unilaterally modifies the status quo of the two sides of the Straits, which everyone tries not to alter so as to avoid a spiralling aggravation of the conflict. Second, it represents a toughening of the Chinese policy with regard to Taiwan. Taipei speaks of a new “red terror” against Taiwanese businesspeople, students or tourists who visit the Chinese mainland, warns against the pressure that may be exerted against those who do not wish to collaborate with the mainland’s policy, and discredits the initiative as a whole, which it describes as a blank cheque to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to invade Taiwan whenever it sees fit. With these arguments, a large mobilization in Taipei is underway, working in two directions. In the international sphere, instructions are sent to its offices abroad, in order to make the government’s position known, and six official delegations are sent to the U.S., Japan and the EU to communicate Taiwan’s concern and earn the support of democratic countries. Internally, social actions are promoted, with demonstrations against the law taking place in Taipei, Kaoshiung and other cities on Sunday the 6th of March. Members of the government do not participate but the demonstrations have their full support. Lee Teng-hui, the former president and leader of the TSU, does participate in the Kaoshiung demonstration. The arguments and the mobilizations are the prelude to a second offensive which takes place, with greater impetus and indignation, after the passing of the law, starting on the 14th of March. The DPP calls the text a “declaration of war” and the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) says it is a “perverse attempt by Beijing to unilaterally change the status quo”. The Prime Minister, Frank Hsieh, talks about constitutional revisions being made in retaliation. The Minister of Defence prepares the army for urban warfare. The Minister of Foreign Affairs recalls the international indifference to the Nazi death camps. President Chen, whose ally Lee Teng-hui demands of him that an anti-annexation law be passed, draws up a six-point statement that reiterates his condemnation of the law and calls for a national mobilization that will bring together hundreds of thousands of people in the streets of Taipei on the 26th of March. Such massive support serves to compensate Chen for his loss in the legislative elections of December. Taipei’s irritation is not shared by the whole of the Taiwanese political scene. The opposition forces condemn the mainland’s initiative but believe it can be considered neither a toughening of mainland policy nor an alteration of the status quo, and that the measure is a consequence of the suicidal policies of President Chen. Ma Ying-jeou, the mayor of Taipei and the leader of KMT as of the 19th August, in the place of Lien Chan, advocates starting up the bilateral dialogue again, to avoid further tensions. A similar discourse is adopted by the PFP and the NP, known as the pan-blues, as opposed to the pan-greens, who support the government. In terms of reactions from abroad, China received the support of Russia, while the EU made a call for moderation. The U.S. expressed its concern about the law’s impact on regional stability, and at the same time it took advantage of the tension created to justify two polemical actions. First of all, the inclusion of Taiwan in the security concerns shared with Japan. Second of all, the increase of pressure on the EU not to lift the arms embargo against China, adding a further argument that would justify the alarm about the supposedly non-peaceful intentions of the Empire of the Centre and contributing to the fear that European weapons could serve to heighten the threat of the Chinese mainland over Taiwan. President Chen warns the EU about the consequences of lifting the embargo, which would be the equivalent of encouraging and supporting a non-democratic and non-pacific country to use force against the rebel island. The truth is that the People’s Republic of China has never renounced the use of force to work out its conflict with Taiwan. And this possibility has also been present during the debate on the law. Hu Jintao, upon taking up his post as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, asked a delegation of the PLA that was present at the NPA to fulfil its historical mission, safeguarding state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the national interests of China. The People’s Daily reminded readers that the PLA is the principal force guaranteeing the predominance of the Communist Party of China in the country’s political life. The passage of the Anti-Secession Law has not brought with it a better image of Chinese policy in regard to Taiwan. Its efforts to explain that the law is designed to prevent war, by dissuading Taiwan’s authorities from declaring independence, have not been accepted. However, judging by later events, it could actually be considered the end of a strategy very different from the one that would be put into place almost simultaneously. While still considering it unfortunate and untimely, it has allowed China to provide itself with a legal basis symmetrical to the Taiwan Relations Act (U.S., 1979), based on the confirmation of the policy followed up to the present, and it will not affect the general improvement of bilateral relations which it is hoped will be enhanced by the defeat of the DPP in the legislative elections of December. At the close of the NPA session, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao would minimize the significance of the law, emphasizing that it is an instrument for avoiding war, not for promoting it. The agreement reached last December in Macao on direct flights between China and Taiwan, on the occasion of the New Lunar Year, was indicative of the shift promoted by Beijing. The agreement was presented as the fruit of an understanding reached at a strictly technical level, with hardly any official representation, and with a parallel dialogue with the main opposition party, the KMT. In 2003, Taiwanese planes could fly to China to pick up its businesspeople so that they could spend time with their families on the island, but they had to fly empty for half of the journey and no mainland aircraft could participate in the programme. This time, after the agreement being impossible in 2004 due to China’s fear that it would reinforce the electoral aspirations of the Taiwanese President, Chen Shui-bian, there are important novelties: equal distribution of special flights; traffic in both directions without stops; more connected cities; deliberate ignoring of the nature of the flights –internal or international–; and the participation of companies of both sides. As they did before, the mainland authorities have tried to marginalize the Taiwanese President from the whole process. First of all, by dimming official participation (in the form of an advisor with a low political profile) in the negotiation, which was conducted by the professional associations of the sector, “de-politicising” the dialogue, directing it at exclusively technical and administrative problems. And second of all, by making the announcement about the agreement to a delegation of the Kuomintang (KMT), the clear winner of the legislative elections and the political force opposing Chen and more inclined to defend the “One-China” thesis, the cornerstone of mainland policy in relation to Taiwan. Even before the final passing of the Anti-Secession Law, Hu Jintao complemented the deliberate ignoring of Chen and his DPP with a policy of approach and dialogue at the highest level with political forces committed to the concept of one China. Sending a delegation from the mainland to attend the funeral of Koo Chen-fu, who had been the president of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) of Taiwan and the main negotiator with China; the speech by Jia Qinglin, Chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an expression of the old policy of the United Front of the CPC, upon the tenth anniversary of Jiang Zemin’s eight points; and the aforementioned Macao agreement regarding direct flights on the occasion of the Year of the Rooster are clear signs of new times. Chen’s efforts to attract the PFP and create a new fracture in its relations with the KMT ended in failure. The PFP, as well as the KMT and the CPC, seem to have reached the logical conclusion that the climate of confrontation has only one political beneficiary, Chen and his party, the DPP. The level of understanding is such that, knowing about the crisis brought about by the mainland’s passage of an Anti-Secession Law, just a few days after the debate began in the NPA, the president of the KMT, Lien Chan, announced publicly on the 27th of February that a KMT delegation would be sent to China to initiate the thaw in relations. Before that, the president of the legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-pyng, also of the KMT, had expressed his willingness to travel to the mainland if invited, to ease tensions and begin a dialogue on the Anti-Secession Law. Once the NPA sessions opened, the mainland’s Civil Aviation Association proposed negotiating again about chartered flights for the upcoming All Souls’ Day. The KMT sends another delegation to discuss the possibility of charter flights to transport goods between Taiwan and China. Chen and the DPP react to these dynamics, reminding people that China has 706 missiles aimed at Taiwan and, under such conditions, now is not the time for dialogue. The division in the Taiwanese political map is clearly becoming deeper and deeper. The KMT delegation, headed by Vice-President Chiang Pin-kun, is comprised of a total of 34 people and includes civil servants, people in public office, and industrial and trade leaders. The trip to China begins two days after hundreds of thousands of people demonstrate in Taiwan against the Anti-Secession Law. The KMT justifies its attitude by saying that it cannot sit back and watch while collision approaches, while there is a need to promote an alternative vision of the problem from that of Chen. The trip’s agenda included visits to the memorial to the martyrs of 1911, to the Sun Yat-sen mausoleum, political encounters at different levels, and a long list of subjects of great interest to both parties (agricultural exports, transport of goods, direct flights, collaboration in the development of the service sector, investment protection, degree equivalence, the tourism market, etc.). The press on the mainland underlines the historic nature of the visit and the spiritual links between citizens on both sides, indicating that the dialogue may be very useful for resolving the trade and economic matters that hinder the development of bilateral relations. Beijing puts the accent on the need to promote exchanges between cities and peoples, in order to establish a dense network of links that will reduce tensions. The fruits of the encounter are set forth in what is called the “ten-point consensus”, which synthesizes the road map of the CPC-KMT dialogue. As was expected, the Taiwanese Presidency reacted by calling the dialogue “inappropriate” and saying that the KMT was turning back the clock 60 or 80 years. The TSU, besides pointing out that the visit had taken place without government authorisation, criticises the ten-point consensus and urges the cabinet not to implement the agreements. The MAC accuses the KMT of trying to take the government’s place and negotiate with China issues that are the responsibility of the government. It warns that their actions may be a violation of the law. The Taiwan High Court Prosecutor’s Office begins an investigation of Chiang Pin-kun, studying the possibility of accusing him of treason. The reaction of KMT is to accuse the current administration of putting judicial power to the use of its political ambitions. In the end, nothing comes of it. The tension is heightened when Jia Qinglin extends an invitation to visit China to Lien Chan, president of the KMT, and to the leaders of other parties who oppose Taiwanese independence and accept the One-China concept. Lien Chan accepts and the trip begins on 26 April in the city of Nanjing, the old capital of the Republic of China, and also includes Shanghai, Xian –where he had lived as a child- and Beijing, where he will meet with President Hu Jintao. The visit has a profound historical significance. It is the first encounter at such a high level between the two parties that engaged in the greatest fratricidal conflict of the 20th century, the Communist Party of China and the Nationalist Party (literal meaning of the word Kuomintang). This meeting opens the third phase of the cross-strait relations since the commencement, at the end of 1978, of Deng Xiaoping’s policy of reform and opening. Initially, the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”, coming among announcements of the end of the bombings, suggested the possibility of an encounter at the highest level, which would mean the CPC and the KMT, back when political pluralism did not yet exist on Formosa Island either. Following this first call, and having overcome the first response by Taipei (the three noes: no contact, no negotiation, no concessions) came the thaw, the visits between family members and, above all, as reform in China progressed, the explosion of economic and trade relations between China and Taiwan. This distension culminates in the para-governmental meeting in Singapore in 1993, which promised a new era in bilateral relations. The visit by President Lee Tenghui to the U.S. causes, in 1995, a serious puncture in relations and hostilities rise once again. They crystallise in the military manoeuvres carried out by mainland China, which take place on the eve of the 1996 presidential elections, the first entirely democratic ones in Taiwan and also in China in their more than five thousand years of existence. The current change of direction has its background in the so-called “eight points” of Jiang Zemin, presented in January of 1995. The then-Secretary General of the Communist Party made a novel proposal with regard to previous positions: extending the Chinese-Taiwanese dialogue to include the different political forces with real presence on the island. The DPP reacts to Chan’s visit as expected, accusing the KMT of being a “tool of Communist propaganda”. Lee Teng-hui accuses Lien Chan of treason and plans to organise a large demonstration in front of KMT headquarters and at the airport on the day of his departure. The MAC releases its “seven points of conclusion” in response to the “ten-point consensus”, recalling that all agreements with foreign governments must be reached by government agencies and respect the law. In addition to the unreserved condemnation and the threat of a governmental boycott of the agreements, the President’s office seems to hint at a third response. In effect, Chen begins to show signs of not wanting to be out of bounds, and switches from the initial accusation of treason to a more and more conciliating discourse. It is worth remembering that governmental presence was not necessary for the airlines of the mainland and the island to make various direct flights on the occasion of the Spring Party. China, with its eyes on the Olympic Games of 2008, knows that Taiwan has millions of potential visitors who could attend the events if the problem of direct flights is finally resolved. One million Taiwanese already live on the mainland and about 300,000 businesspeople from the island contribute to the dynamism of bilateral relations. The profit margin of their activity is high but is certainly affected by the lack of connections and direct exchanges. If this problem is solved, it will be very difficult for President Chen to continue blandishing the image of mainland hostility and aggressiveness which has brought him so many electoral and political benefits to date. However, he does not want to appear to be the main obstacle nor does he seem willing to give up his bit of glory if the agreement is reached. With this frame of mind, he ends up supporting Lien Chan’s trip, although the latter only agrees to inform Chen in advance about the details of the visit without actually meeting with him, as Chen had asked. Chen, in turn, justifies his change of mind by stating that everything had been “better explained”. As a result of Lien Chan’s visit to China, the KMT and the CPC agree to set up a platform for interparty communication, in order to promote non-official dialogues on a regular basis and work toward the shared objective of intensifying exchanges. The agreement calls for the creation of two fora: on the peaceful development of both sides of the Taiwan Straits, and on economic and cultural exchanges. In addition to the directors of both parties, various other social sectors are invited to participate in the fora. As for the PFP, Hu Jintao extends an invitation for a visit to China before Lien Chan begins his travels around the mainland. James Soong responds positively to the proposal and visits Nanjing, Xian, Shanghai and Hunan. Soong, who is accompanied by a delegation of sixty people, makes a speech at the University of Qinghua, and also meets with Hu Jintao, thus showing his willingness to help ease the tension in the Straits and contribute to the stability of bilateral relations. The trip by James Soong inspired a less virulent reaction in the DPP. Chen’s contacts with the leader of the PFP are the only ones he manages to maintain with the opposition, although they are not so good that Soong was willing to transmit a message from Chen to Hu Jintao. Soong rejected the offer saying that he was nobody’s messenger. The Presidential Palace limited itself to recalling that political leaders must respect the law during their visits to China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not hesitate to point out that in the end China had no choice but to dialogue with the leaders elected by the people of Taiwan, highlighting its scepticism about whether this new diplomacy on the part of China could be confirmed as an effective mechanism for making progress in bilateral relations. The procession continues in July, with the visit of the President of the NP, Yok Mu-ming, who, leading a thirty-member delegation, will attend the acts organized to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the war against Japan. The delegation, in which the Secretary General of the Party, Li Sheng-feng, also participates, visits Nanjing, Guangzhou, Dalian and Beijing, where a high-level meeting takes place with Hu Jintao. Hu invites the NP, which currently has only one representative in the legislative Yuan, to give its support to the policies made possible by the common accord between the KMT and the PFP to slow down independence activities and develop bilateral relations in order to achieve peaceful reunification. Taiwan is thus driving in two lanes. Continuing with his play on words, Frank Hsieh’s government states in February that his political activity would focus on economic development, social justice and the environment. Before the beginning of the new legislature, Hsieh met with all the parties that have representation in the Yuan to announce to them his commitment not to present any controversial legislative initiatives without first consulting all of the opposition. This conciliatory offer was completed with an invitation to the opposition to designate a candidate for the post of deputy prime minister, which should have been filled by a vice-president of the KMT, Chiang Pin-kun. The offer was rejected. However, once the new National Assembly was constituted, following elections held in March with a very low level of participation (23%), President Chen once again launched the idea of a second phase of constitutional reforms, with the aim of Taiwan having a new Carta Magna before the end of his mandate (2008). In addition, the government decides to remit to the legislative Yuan an amendment to the referendum law, which will broaden the objectives (including the modification of the territorial scope of the country), reduce the number of required voters for the popular initiative and lower the minimum quorum to a quarter of the population, except in the case of territorial modification, which will require half. Both initiatives will find the certain opposition of the pan-blues and have difficulty passing. In the other lane a different kind of traffic flows, in a different direction and which will be hard for the government to stop. The mainland offers become more and more attractive and both the opposition as well as different elements of civil society can hardly resist the expected benefits from such a dialogue. In mid-August a KMT delegation presided by Zeng Yongquan travels to Beijing to discuss the promotion of direct flights for freight and passengers, in what might become a habitual dynamic from now on. The attempt by the government to relaunch the SEF with the appointment of the former Prime Minister Chang Chun-hsiung as Chairman and with increased funding to restart its activities, seeks to avoid the marginalization that China is attempting to further. However, without an interlocutor on the other side, until Chen announces his acceptance of the One-China principle, the possibility of his recovering leadership in the bilateral dialogue seems unlikely. The mainland is confirmed to be Taiwan’s largest export market and the greatest contributor to the island’s trade surplus. Indirect exchanges total 438.2 billion dollars, of which 366.7 billion correspond to China’s imports from the island, according to He Shizhong, director of the economic section of the mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office. Up to the end of May 2005, China had authorised the creation of 65,568 companies with Taiwanese funds, with an investment valuing 82.77 billion dollars. Of this sum 40.58 billion dollars have been used. To foment trade and facilitate investment, China has authorised the creation of four Taiwanese investment areas, in the cities of Fuzhou, Xiamen, Xinglin and Jimei; various science and technology parks in Shenyang, Nanking, Chengdu and Wuhan; experimental areas for agricultural co-operation in the provinces of Fujian, Shandong, Hainan, Heilongjiang and Shaanxi; and business parks for Taiwanese agricultural workers in Fujian, Shandong, Sichuan and Heilongjiang. Also, approval has been given to the creation on the mainland of two banks and an insurance company from Taiwan, seven bank branches and another 30 branches of nine underwriters from Taiwan, and 12 securities companies from the island. On the mainland there are already 38 branches of Taiwanese maritime transport companies and four Taiwanese airlines have opened offices on the continent. The exchanges have progressed a great deal, especially in the last six years. Exports to China, by air, have increased by 39% and the imports by 32%. The former, in 2004, amounted to 24.9 billion $US, and the latter to 5.4 billion $US. But the non-existence of direct flights means that expedition costs are very high. For this reason there is a lot of pressure to reach an agreement that will allow for direct flights between Taiwan and China. Last May, the chairman of the National Association of Industry and Commerce, Theodore Huang, called upon the prime minister to start working in this direction again. The European Chamber of Commerce in Taipei has also requested that Chinese airlines be authorised to set up offices on the island so that airline tickets can be issued there. All this would require lightening up the security discourse which is so important to Taipei. Perhaps a first sign of a different attitude can be found in the decision to authorise regular flights to fly over the Chinese mainland, lifting a prohibition that has been in effect for half a century. The island’s government has decided to also allow the negotiation of direct flights, for both freight and for passengers, and has designated the Taipei Airlines Association as interlocutor. A new phase of flexibility could come about in the middle of September, with the festivities marking the arrival of autumn. If the government does not move forward, others will do so in its place. In the middle of August, a delegation of the KMT, presided by Zeng Yongquan, travelled to Beijing to discuss the promotion of direct flights for freight and passengers. More than 3 million Taiwanese come and go each year, but since there are no direct flights, they must spend 3 billion dollars more than necessary. This situation weighs quite a bit in the pocketbooks of many citizens. Chen Yulin, head of the CPC’s Taiwan Affairs Office has shown willingness to normalise the air traffic between the two parties. On the agricultural front, the DPP has found itself obliged to criticise the Taiwan Provincial Farmers Association for its plan to send a delegation to China for talks with mainland representatives on the export of fruit from Taiwan. The DPP, which has a broad base of support among farmers, demands that governmental authority be respected, warning of the chaos that may result if the government is excluded from negotiations on this matter. Beijing, with the willingness announced to the KMT, has already authorised the entry of 15 types of fruits, with no tax obligations and with speedier dispatch of customs and inspection, and the Association has not hesitated to travel to the capital of the mainland to work out the final details. Another change that is underway may affect tourism, very much conditioned by demands related to security. In May, the Taipei government announced that it will put in effect a trial period for receiving visitors from China. To begin with, they will come only from certain cities and will number about 1000 per day. It can only be the beginning of a deeper change. In short, China is aware of the strength of its appeal. Its proposals for solving certain problems of interest to the citizens of the island can have a large impact on the professional and sectorial associations of Taiwan, regardless of the level of influence of the various political parties in such associations. The DPP can hardly express opposition to the development of such links and whether it does so or not, its position will be politically uncomfortable. China knows that the U.S. will play an important role in the final solution of this conflict. But in which lane is Washington driving? Let us look at a few examples. The whole debate about lifting the EU arms embargo against China has had as a backdrop –more than the issue of human rights–, the hypothesis of a military conflict with Taiwan. In fact, it is Taipei, along with Seoul, Tokyo and Washington that have been at the head of opposition to such a measure, put forward by some European countries. At the end of February, important members of the U.S. Congress warned the EU about the possible harmful consequences of deciding to lift the arms embargo against China. The legislators, headed by the Republican Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met with Bush to convey to him their opinion. And Bush, in the meeting with the EU on 22 February in Brussels, spoke against lifting the embargo. His position has been just as inflexible when it comes to the possible purchase of Unocal by the Chinese oil company CNOOC. As for Donald Rumsfeld, in an appearance in Singapore at the beginning of June, he called Chinese military expenses unjustified, warning of the threat that a militarily modern China may represent for regional security. On the Fox News channel, Bush says he would support Taiwan in the event that it were attacked by China. The U.S. and Japan have made the question of Taiwan a part of their common strategic objectives. In February 2005, in Washington, both countries decided to reinforce their alliance in Asia Pacific and at the worldwide level. In their 50 years of military alliance, they had never mentioned this subject as a matter of shared concern, which gives an idea of the magnitude of the current change: from now on, the two countries will co-operate in the treatment of all the factors of instability in Eastern Asia. China expressed its concern about such an announcement and the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kong Quan, recalled that the U.S.-Japan alliance should not exceed the strict framework of bilateral relations. China is concerned that the tone of the agreement may send the wrong message to those in favour of Taiwan’s independence. At the beginning of July, Tang Jiaxuan, the former Chinese foreign minister, visited Washington and met with the principal leaders there: Condoleezza Rice (foreign affairs), Stephen Hadley (national security), John Snow (treasury) and also President Bush. In September a meeting between Bush and Hu will take place. Tang has stated publicly that he is in favour of maintaining the status quo with Taiwan, thus earning the approval of the U.S. He underlines that Taiwan is the key to bilateral relations and that they can grow and improve only if there is agreement on this point. In the meantime, on the 28th July the House of Representatives, which has passed a resolution condemning the Anti-Secession Law, suggests, upon approving the State Department’s 2006-2007 budget, that encounters between high-level officials of Taiwan, including its President and Vice-President, or the Ministry of Defence or Foreign Affairs, with their U.S. counterparts should be facilitated. The Administration will probably not follow its advice, but such a suggestion is enough to irritate China. David Lee, representative of Taiwan in Washington, has stated that bilateral relations with the U.S. can be characterized as mutually trusting. President Chen has announced his intention to make a stop in San Francisco in September, right when Hu Jintao is visiting the U.S. The question that most worries the Washington-Taipei-Beijing axis refers to the military issue. The general dialogue between Washington and Beijing on the subject of defence has improved recently. At the end of January, the U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defence, Richard Lawless, and the General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, met for conversations on the situation in the Straits and the ways to increase naval security. There has been talk of a red telephone that could improve the response capability in crisis situations. But the main problem centres on the issue of military balance and weapon acquisitions. Two days after the Anti-Secession Law was passed by the NPA, a Pentagon delegation arrived in Taipei to analyse the defensive capabilities of Taiwan and the impact of China’s espionage activities. The objective was to evaluate the possibilities of an asymmetrical war provoked by China and the presence of a fifth column on the island, organised among the 4000 clandestine Chinese immigrants that reside there. Prior to this, the president of the legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-pyng (KMT), received Theresa Shaheen, the former chairperson of the Taipei offices of the American Institute in Taiwan, the body in charge of bilateral contacts in the absence of diplomatic relations, who pointed out that the refusal to vote for the budgetary appropriations necessary to buy weapons could become an obstacle in bilateral relations. Taipei must show its willingness to defend itself, she stated. The proposal consists of committing 610.8 million Taiwanese dollars to the acquisition, among other items, of 8 conventional submarines, a fleet of 12 Orion P-3C maritime surveillance aircraft and 6 sets of Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile missiles. With the Pentagon delegation still on Taiwanese soil, the opposition rejected in the Yuan the possibility that a parliamentary commission join the analysis of the budget for acquiring new arms, now reduced to 130 billion Taiwanese dollars, as opposed to the initial 610 billion, a figure considered far too high by the PFP and the KMT. At the same time, to obtain the consent of the members of parliament, it was made known that China will build, between now and 2015, various aircraft carriers that will allow it to break the current military balance. It is estimated that by 2012 China will have moved beyond the defensive capabilities of Taiwan. While the entry of different Chinese boats into the territorial waters of Taiwan is made public, the U.S. hurries Chen to make a decision regarding his purchases. But it is not in his hands alone. On the 1st August, the three co-chairs of the U.S. Senate send a letter to Ma, the new chairman of the KMT, urging him to support the purchase of armament from the U.S. The DPP calls a demonstration for the 25th September in Taipei to urge the opposition to support the purchase. In view of the possibility of an armed conflict, maintaining a level of dissuasion with regard to China means having the military means necessary in the area, greater than the current ones, and also making explicitly known the willingness to intervene. But it also means pressuring Taiwan to assume responsibility for its own defence, by buying the weapons that its main ally would sell it. The unification concept is not entirely to the liking of the U.S.. If Taiwan becomes part of China, the latter will see its regional influence grow and the credibility of the U.S. in the area will be reduced. Washington is trying to convey to the neighbouring countries the significance of the Chinese threat. Japan seconds this discourse, as it fears that the emergence of China may also affect its regional interests. Taiwan is another of the reasons why the relations between China and Japan have deteriorated in recent months. At the beginning of April anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in Beijing and Guangdong, the excuse being the publication of school books that minimise the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s. The mobilisations then spread to other cities, leading bilateral relations to their worst moment since 1972. In a conversation held in the Chinese capital city on 17 April, the respective foreign ministers, Li Zhaoxing and Nobutaka Machimura, tried to clear up these misunderstandings but without much success. Despite the positive development of their economic relations, in the political sphere Japan’s unwavering alignment with the U.S. and its hesitant attitude with regard to the pro-independence ideas of Lee Teng-hui (who was given a visa at the end of 2004) and Chen, the presence in Prime Minister Koizumi’s government of numerous Taiwan supporters, and its support for Taipei’s request to join the World Health Organisation all do very little to improve relations. Last of all, in the diplomatic battle between China and Taiwan, the pressure exerted by Beijing is becoming more and more intense. In January, the People’s Republic of China re-established diplomatic relations with Grenada, which had been interrupted in 1989, making Grenada the fifth ally that has changed sides in only four years. Taipei has compensated this loss with the recovery of Nauru, after a three year interruption. Its fear of suffering setbacks in this arena has motivated Taiwan to take serious action. In the second half of March the vice-president Annette Lu made a trip to El Salvador and Guatemala. President Chen, at the beginning of May, visited the Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu. Also, the opening of a branch of the ERDB (European Reconstruction and Development Bank) in Taipei is announced, as new strategies are devised for joining the United Nations, or the WHO, always with the staunch opposition of the Chinese mainland, which also rejects Taiwan joining the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as an observing member or the OAS (Organization of American States) where a dozen countries (of a total of 35) are diplomatic allies of Taiwan. Fears regarding its regional or international isolation go beyond the strictly political dimension. Taiwan does not want to find itself marginalized from the economic integration process and it thus makes many efforts to sign Free Trade Agreements with a number of its allies. It has even proposed such an agreement to Japan. Chen has announced his intention to participate in the heads of state and government summit organised by the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, which will be held in South Korea in November, and he wants to meet with Hu. Since 1991, when Taiwan joined the APEC, neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Minister of Taiwan have been able to participate in these summits. Chen states that he is willing to participate in the event under the denomination “Chinese Taipei”, using neither Taiwan nor the Republic of China. But even so, his presence does not appear to be viable. China is centring a good part of its diplomatic activity in the area of Central America and the Caribbean. Haiti and the Dominican Republic were visited in January by Cai Wu, the deputy head of the International Liaison Department of the PCP. In Haiti, which has maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China since 1956, China has troops working as part of a United Nations mission and pressures the Haitian government by threatening to refuse to extend the mandate of the UN mission. In response to China’s diplomatic offensive, Taiwan has encouraged the founding of the Democratic Pacific Union, a body created in August with the objective of supporting economic co-operation promoted by Taipei. The DPU brings together 26 countries, the same ones that diplomatically recognize Taiwan. China will not have great difficulty putting its new policies into effect. Its understanding with the Taiwan opposition, the majority in the legislative Yuan, regarding the main issues may block any attempt by Chen and the DPP to move forward along a confrontational line with the mainland (legislation on a referendum, new constitutional text, purchase of weapons). In addition, the receptiveness and the interest shown by civic and non-governmental associations in finding a solution to the numerous practical problems that affect the development of bilateral links or the establishment of direct links between local communities, may contribute to consolidate the stability China so intensely wants. The well-known pragmatism of the mainland authorities seems to suggest a phase characterised by the supremacy of technical negotiation for solving practical matters, with a minimum of political interference, which, paradoxically, will bring about an intense cross-fire in the Taiwanese political scene. The new Chairman of the KMT, Ma Ying-jeou, a likely presidential candidate in 2008, supports stabilising relations with China and rejects independence, while advocating an agreement for unification in the long-term. The new Chairman of the DPP, Su Tseng-chang, elected last February 15th to replace Chen, who had stepped down because of the poor electoral results in December, guarantees the continuity of the sovereignty project. So the swords are still raised and a fierce battle is on the horizon to governmentalize the agreements being established by society on both sides. The government is not only in the minority, it just may be left out of the game. The most radical position will be the one held by Lee Teng-hui and his TSU. Lee is convinced that Beijing has lost all hope for a peaceful reunification and has decided to attain it by force. The protection of Taiwan is thus only viable if it rests on a U.S.-Japan security pact. China’s main problem continues to be earning the trust of the U.S. and convincing it of the Asian giant’s good intentions and the peaceful nature of its emergence. But if a policy of contention prevails in Washington it will not be easy to reach a new compromise on Taiwan.
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 Instituto Galego de Análise e Documentación Internacional www.igadi.org ÚLTIMA REVISIÓN: 20/11/2005
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