   Presencia-Opinión / Europa
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| Swedes’ Say Nej to the Euro: Causes and Consequences Por Benjamín Kienzle (Canal Mundo, 07/10/2003) |
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The social democratic government under Göran Persson was soundly defeated at last Sunday’s referendum, in which 56.1% of Swedish voters rejected their country’s entry into the euro zone. Only 41.8% voted ‘ja’ (yes). Although the opinion polls had foreseen a victory of the nej (no) camp, the clarity of the result was surprising, as all the large parties, the economic leaders and the mass media had supported the introduction of the euro. Moreover, after the tragic assassination of Anna Lindh, the popular Foreign Minister and a fervent supporter of the euro, the possibility existed that the ja (yes) camp could have won the referendum. So why did the Swedes vote so clearly against the euro? First of all, the campaign in favour of the euro could not convince the Swedes, who are in general sceptical of Europe. Although the campaign was more than well-financed, differences within the social democratic party, even within the government, and between some business leaders weakened it, particularly because the opposition – the greens, the left party and the trade unions – was more united. Anyhow, this cannot explain the clear defeat of the government. Secondly, Göran Persson and other supporters of the euro argued after the referendum that the bad economic situation in Germany and France – partly the consequence of the rigid monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) – had discouraged Swedish voters. However, the Prime Minister and his team should have reckoned with this economic situation in Europe and, thus, should not have focused on economic arguments. In particular, they should have predicted improvements of Sweden’s economic situation with the euro, because Sweden has already a lower unemployment rate, higher economic growth and a more generous welfare state than most countries in the euro zone: why repair something that is not broken? This does not mean that there are no economic arguments in favour of the euro such as the elimination of exchange rate fluctuations. However, there are also economic arguments against the euro, for example that four of Sweden’s five most important trading partners do not have the euro, namely Norway, Denmark, the UK and the United States. In general, the future of the euro and its long-term effects are still unpredictable. It is uncertain where it will lead to. Consequently, Göran Persson should not have defended the euro with economic, but political arguments, as the euro is basically a political project to press ahead with European integration. At the same time, he should have realised the Swede’s fear of the euro is essentially a political fear. Why is that? Although the current economic situation of Sweden in view of the European one definitely influenced the outcome of the referendum, the actual causes are deeper and of a political nature. The majority of Swedes knows that the economic situation can change – with or without the euro. But they also know that with the krona and an independent and democratically legitimised monetary policy, Sweden has more means to intervene during a recession in its own country. On the contrary, the principal objective of the ECB, which is responsible for the monetary policy in the euro zone, is only currency stability, but neither economic growth nor the safeguarding of jobs in the member states. Moreover, the BCE in Frankfurt is an institution far away from the majority of Europeans and it is difficult for their representatives to control it. Therefore, the Swedes feared that they would lose their democratic influence on the Swedish economy in the euro zone. An advertisement by the opponents clarifies this point: “Should six bank directors have control over your economy? Yes to democracy. No to EMU” (quoted in Guardian Unlimited). This fear is increased by the general lack of democratic legitimization of the whole EU. For example, already 60% of national laws are the result of European decisions – but not by the citizens’ representatives in Europe. Therefore, the Swedes rejected the introduction of the euro because of the democratic lack of the EU’s monetary policy and of the EU in general. Göran Persson should have fought for more democracy in the European monetary policy as a run-up to the referendum, which would have had many positive effects: First, he could have defended the euro as a political project to integrate Sweden in a more democratic and stable Europe. Secondly, he could not only have convinced more easily the Swedes but also the Danes and British. Thirdly, he would have pressed ahead with the democratisation and integration of the EU. But how he actually did it, namely to concentrate on ambiguous economic arguments, will leave the Swedes outside the euro zone at least until 2013 and all the other Europeans will still have a euro zone with fundamental democratic deficits. Furthermore, the euro supporters in the UK, including the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, cannot press ahead anymore with the UK’s entry into the euro zone – for this they would have needed the boost from a Swedish ‘yes’, as the starting position is even worse in the UK than in Sweden. At least the Swedes used their democratic rights to reject their incorporation into a project with democratic deficits and gained, thus, a victory for Swedish democracy. |
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Benjamín Kienzle, estudiante en prácticas no IGADI. |
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ÚLTIMA REVISIÓN: 11/10/2003 |
