   Presencia-Opinión / Europa
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| The EU’s Military Operation in the Congo: A Drop in the
Ocean? Por Benjamín Kienzle (Canal Mundo, 09/09/2003) |
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In Greek mythology ‘Artemis’ was the goddess of hunting and wild animals. Recently, those responsible for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) chose her name as the code of the military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This was rather not a good omen. However, ‘Artemis’ was also the goddess of birth, and as this operation was the first European military mission outside of Europe without help from NATO, to use the code-name ‘Artemis’ makes actually more sense. But was it a better omen, too? As the mission finished on 1 September, it is now possible to analyse its results. In general, the European press has judged it in a positive way. For instance, the BBC quoted a man from the city of Bunia in the northeast of the Congo saying that “before it was very bad - we were living like rabbits. Now there is peace. We can be in our homes: resting, cooking and strolling down the road. It is very good.“ Given the limits of its tasks and the general context, the military operation was indeed a success. Since 1998 the DRC has suffered from a very violent conflict with approximately 3 million victims. It has been a highly complex conflict between various, and sometimes changing, coalitions of rebels and the regime of Laurent Kabila and, after his assassination in 2001, of his son Joseph. Furthermore, at least six neighbouring states have intervened in the conflict – first Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi supporting the rebels and later Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia on the side of the regime in Kinshasa. Not without reason this war is called ‘Africa’s First World War.’ Already in 1999 a peace process between the fighting parties began, which ended – after several setbacks – with the withdrawal of the majority of foreign forces and with the Pretoria Agreement in December 2002 between the most important groups of the conflict. However, the withdrawal of foreign forces left a vacuum in some areas, particularly in the north-eastern province of Ituri. According to reports of the Overseas Development Institute in London, the International Crisis Group and other NGOs, intense conflicts between rebel splinter groups in this province gave rise to the suspicion that the genocide of Rwanda of 1994 could repeat itself, which would shatter the fragile peace process. Moreover, these conflicts were intensified by ethnic rivalries, conflicts about the large natural resources and by foreign interventions. Consequently, the UN Security Council authorised in May 2003 a multinational force to guarantee the stability in Ituri, as its own small MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) force would have been unable to hold out in the province until September, when its reinforcements arrived. The EU offered, therefore, a 1400-strong force led by France, which finally arrived in Bunia, the capital of Ituri, in June. Three reasons can be put forward why this military mission was more than a drop in the ocean: First, the European forces have stabilised at least the capital, although mutual killings continued in the rest of the province. However, 100000 soldiers would have been necessary for the complete pacification of a province the size of Spain according to the International Peace Missions Centre in Berlin – something unimaginable in Europe’s current political situation. Secondly, the DRC peace process is still on its way. In July, the leaders of the most important rebel groups were sworn-in as vice-presidents in accordance with the country’s new constitution. Thirdly, the EU and its young CFSP demonstrated that they take and are capable to take – at least partly – its humanitarian responsibilities outside of Europe, although it is important to keep in mind that the French government has also again strong geopolitical and financial interests in Africa. In spite of these limited successes, the EU’s military operation in the Congo also shows the fundamental deficiencies of its CFSP. In particular, the Europeans do not deal seriously with the deeper causes of the war in the Congo, which are, at the same time, the deeper causes of the majority of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. Which are these ‘deeper causes’? First, the unjust trade relations between Africa and the Western World, particularly with the EU, are co-responsible for the downfall of the economic and social situation in sub-Saharan Africa after the Cold War, which is, in turn, the breeding-ground for ethnic conflicts. Secondly, multinational corporations can exploit the natural resources of the Congo (gold, diamonds, coltan, etc.) and of other parts of Africa without serious limits by European governments. Moreover, these multinational corporations finance the war in the Congo by providing money and arms to the rebel groups in exchange for access to natural resources. Thirdly, the EU has not put sufficient pressure on the foreign states that have had forces in the Congo and that still profit from the conflict. Although the current military mission was as such a limited success, if the Europeans will not address these deeper causes, they will not avoid the outbreak of new conflicts and, thus, similar successes in the future will more and more turn into drops in the ocean. At least Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU, recognised in the report ‘A Secure Europe in a better world’ of 20 June 2003 that “in contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military.” But we are still waiting for the deeds. |
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Benjamín Kienzle, estudiante en prácticas no IGADI. |
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ÚLTIMA REVISIÓN: 18/09/2003 |
