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| Presentación |
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O discurso de George W. Bush ante o Congreso estadounidense o pasado
xoves 3 de febreiro, permitiu especular, dun xeito provisional, que Irán podería convertirse no próximo
obxectivo político ou militar da administración norteamericana, na liña do plan de Washington
de construir o “Grande Oriente Medio”. Xa anteriormente, o vicepresidente Dick Cheney cualificou o réxime
de Teherán como “unha prioridade na loita contra o terrorismo”, aínda que na xira europea da secretaria
de Estado, Condoleeza Rice, ésta asegurara que Irán “non está na axenda estadounidense, polo
momento”.
O que sí semella claro é que Teherán xoga un papel xeopolítico importante para os intereses
norteamericanos, dende Asia Central ata Oriente Medio, pasando polo Mar Caspio e o Golfo Pérsico. A clave
da crise actual compete ao programa nuclear iraní, se ben o réxime dos ayatollahs se comprometera
a suspender temporalmente o programa, trala presión diplomática europea (concretamente británica,
francesa e alemá) e deu sinais importantes de estar disposto a suscribir o Tratado de Non Proliferación
Nuclear, auspiciado polas Nacións Unidas.
O factor nuclear en Irán evidencia tamén unha dimensión de seguridade nacional e de prestixio
internacional. En Teherán recean dos intereses estadounidenses tralas invasións de Afganistán
e Iraq, e consideran que Israel (que sí ten desenvolvido un amplo programa nuclear) pode atentar contra
as pretensións nucleares iranís, como fixo co reactor atómico iraquí de Osirak en 1981.
Do mesmo xeito, a proximidade xeográfica dun Paquistán nuclear e aliado de EEUU, permitiu ao réxime
iraní afianzar as súas relacións xeoestratéxicas con China e India.
Programa nuclear aparte, a retórica de Bush cara Irán semella tamén a que fixera meses anteriores
á invasión militar a Iraq, en marzo de 2003. Irán forma parte do chamado “eixe do mal” de
Bush e as intencións norteamericanas de ver fora de combate ao réxime teocrático en Teherán
non son un segredo. O presidente estadounidense recalca a idea da democratización de Oriente Medio e no
discurso sobre o Estado da Unión, enviou unha mensaxe de apoio oficial aos grupos iranís opositores
ao réxime dos ayatollahs, especialmente o Consello Nacional de Resistencia de Irán e o seu brazo
armado, os Guerreiros Santos do Pobo, MEK nas súas siglas en persa. Bush realiza este aviso nun momento
político concreto: en maio, Irán celebrará eleccións presidenciais, onde os reformistas
de Mohammed Khatami van camiño de perder a súa potencialidade en favor da liña teocrática
dos ayatollahs. Do mesmo xeito, en Washington semella cobrar forza o auspiciamento dunha revolta popular en Irán
que permita un goberno de transición liderado polo fillo do deposto Sha de Persia, Reza Pahlavi, de 45 anos.
Neste escenario, Washington e Europa moven pezas nos ámbitos diplomático e político, aínda
que no Pentágono xa se activaron os preparativos militares, tal e como revelou o periodista, Seymour M.
Hersh. Mentres, Teherán busca gañar tempo para obter unha victoria diplomática e non renunciar
por completo ao seu programa nuclear. En calquera caso, a actual crise pon de manifesto a entrada nunha nova etapa
da política de disuasión da proliferación nuclear, mantida polas Nacións Unidas e a
Axencia Internacional da Enerxía Atómica, e a dificultade do tratamento de crises internacionales
deste calibre, como xa sucedera anteriormente co réxime de Saddam Hussein en Iraq. |
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| Índice |
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| 1 |
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“Irán
y las armas nucleares”, por Sharam Chubin, en La Vanguardia (España), 7 de febreiro de 2005.
No cabe duda de que Irán ha invertido
en su programa nuclear y se ha esforzado mucho por mantener en secreto su alcance. Ahora bien, no creo que haya
decidido definitivamente obtener armas nucleares. Su enfoque parece haber sido más el de ver qué
puede conseguir, el de esperar y ver, dar una de cal y otra de arena, sin cerrarse ninguna puerta. De ahí
que la reacción internacional sea crítica a la hora de condicionar sus políticas futuras.
Esta reacción deber ser unitaria y firme, pero también justa. |
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| 2 |
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“The ball is in the Ayatollah's court”, por Safa
Haeri, en Iran Press Service (Irán), 4 de febreiro de 2005.
According to well-informed French sources
(...) Mr. Reza Pahlavi, the 45 years-old son of the late Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who was toppled by the Islamic revolution
of 1979, is being “worked out” as a possible leader for coalition of Iranian forces, considered as “much more credible
than the Iraqi dissidents under Saddam Hussein” to replace the present Islamic system with a transitory government. |
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| 3 |
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“Jaw-jaw,
for now”, en The Economist (Gran Bretaña), 29 de xaneiro de 2005.
Some combinations of offers and threats
may yet deflect Iran from further enrichment work. That would take concerted pressure from Europe, America and
others, including Russia and China. If the Europeans get nowhere, Iran´s nuclear transgression could be reported
to the UN Security Council. But would it then impose sanctions that would give Iran pause? |
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| 4 |
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“Let's not make the same mistakes in Iran”, por David
Kay, en The Washington Post
(EEUU), 7 de febreiro de 2005.
Nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran would
be a grave danger to the world. That is not what in doubt. What is in doubt is the ability to the US government
to honestly assess Iran's nuclear status and to craft a set of measures that will cope with that threat short of
military action by the United States or Israel. |
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| 5 |
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“The
Human Rights case against attacking Iran”,
por Shirin Ebadi e Hadi
Ghaemi, en The New York Times (EEUU), 8 de febreiro de 2005.
American hipocrisy doesn't help, either.
Given the longstanding willingness of the American government to overlook abuses of human rights, particularly
women´s rights, by close allies in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia, it is hard not to see the Bush administration´s
focus on human rights violations in Iran as a cloak for its larger strategic interests. |
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| 6 |
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“The coming wars”, por Seymour
M. Hersh, en The New Yorker (EEUU), 17 de xaneiro de 2005.
The Pentagon´s contingency plans for
a broader invasion of Iran are also being updated. Strategists at the headquarters or the U.S. Central Command,
in Tampa, Florida, have been asked to revise the military´s war plan, providing for a maximum ground and
air invasion of Iran. Updating the plan make sense, whether or not the Administration intends to act, because the
geopolitics of the region have changed dramatically in the late three years. Previously, an American invasion force
would have had to enter Iran by sea, by way of the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman; now troops could move in on
the ground, from Afghanistan or Iraq. Commando units and other assets could be introduced through new bases in
the Central Asian republics. |
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| 7 |
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“Looking for a new good spies”, por Christopher
Dickey, Mark Hosenball e Michael Hirsh,
en Newsweek (EEUU), 7 de febreiro de 2005.
Many inside the administration believe the
diplomatic efforts of the so-called European Three –Britain, France and Germany- are mere Band-Aids and will only
delay Tehran´s unstinting efforts to build a nuclear bomb, which intel analysts say is about five years off.
But even most hawks agree that U.S. military options in Iran are just as unpalatable. What´s left? Bush hopes
that his rhetoric of freedom will inspire dissidents within Iran. But some hard-liners in the Defense Department
want a more “forward leaning” policy: quietly pushing for regime change by making use of exiles like former MEK
(Mujahedin-e-Khalq, People´s Holy Warriors) members. |
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| 8 |
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“L'Iran
à l'épreuve de la nouvelle situation stratégique au Moyen-Orient”, por Khattar
Abou Diab, en Géopolitique (Francia), Nº 88, octobre-décembre 2004.
Dans cette région qui “engendre le
terrorisme” selon la lecture américaine, et qui risque d´être le terrain d´une prolifération
des ADM, l´Iran représente un enjeu de taille pour la politique américaine dans le prochaine
période. Cette politique sera intimement liée à l´évolution de la donne irakienne
e du dossier nucléaire iranien. |
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| 9 |
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“America's though rethoric on Iran”, por Paul
Reynolds, en BBC
(Gran Bretaña), 4 de febreiro de 2005.
The United States regards Iran as a troublemaker
in the region, helping Hezbollah fight Israel from Lebanon and helping Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Iran
regards the United States as an evil empire (...) But there is something else, and that something else is Israel
(...) It is possible that if the talks fail and Iran presses ahead with enrichment, then Israel would consider
mounting an air attack. |
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| 10 |
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“A nuclear Iran is not the problem”, por Peter
Preston, en The Guardian (Gran Bretaña), 7 de febreiro de 2005.
There is a answer to that, naturally: a
Tom Clancy-style spiel featuring terror groups, greedy scientists, berserk mullahs and the rest (basically cold
war porridge re-heated for a new audience). Yet, in truth, it´s a thin little theme. Is civil nuclear power
fading from use? To the contrary, nuclear power is a continuing fact of 21st-century life that many poorer nations
in search of development feel obliged to fund and acknowledge. |
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| 11 |
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“Military rumblings on Iran”, editorial en Iran Focus News, 27 de xaneiro de 2005.
The most effective leverage available to
Washington is international economic sanctions. If American diplomacy can line up traditional European allies,
there is a fair chance that the Iranian nuclear program can still be stopped. |
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| 12 |
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“Empower Iran's opposition forces”, por Maryam
Rajavi, en Iran Focus News, 28 de xaneiro de 2005.
There is no need for war; no one would want
to see an Iraq II played out in Iran. But engagement, which has shaped policy toward Iran on both sides of the
Atlantic for two decades, has been a disaster; strengthening the most radical factions of the ruling theocracy
(...) But there is another answer: democracy (...) As a firts step in that direction, Western governments must
not assist the ruling theocracy. |
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| 13 |
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“Nuclear Iran: Repercussions for Turkey and Saudi
Arabia”, por Jonathan Feiser,
en The Power
and Interest News Report (EEUU), 28 de
xaneiro de 2005.
The likely results of U.S. allies Turkey
and Saudi Arabia pursing a nuclear Iran with a “neutral course” remains an option defined by both internal domestic
consensus and fear of being perceived “too close” to the United States or its “war on terrorism” for political
and/or ideological reasons. |
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