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| Presentación |
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Trala morte de Yasser Arafat, a Autoridade Nacional Palestina atópase
ante unha complexa situación relativa á sucesión do histórico rais, en medio dun novo
escenario internacional aínda incerto para acadar unha solución do conflicto co Israel. As eleccións
presidenciais palestinas previstas para o 9 de xaneiro de 2005, poderían aclarar un panorama cheo tanto
de dúbidas como de expectativas.
Neste panorama, atópanse tres grandes grupos de poder. O primeiro é o controlado por Mahmoud Abbas,
mellor coñecido como Abu Mazen, nestes momentos o político sinalado como garante da transición
ata as eleccións de xaneiro. Abbas, así como o primeiro ministro Ahmed Qurei, conforman a chamada
“vella garda” do grupo Al Fatah da Organización para a Liberación de Palestina, nacida a mediados
dos anos sesenta. Esta “vella garda” veu gobernando a Autoridade Nacional Palestina desde a súa creación
tralos acordos de Oslo en 1993, e están considerados pola comunidade internacional como os principais interlocutores.
Nembargantes, a súa avanzada idade (preto dos 70 anos), a súa incapacidade para controlar as diversas
faccións dentro de Al Fatah e o avance dos movementos islamistas, e a percepción popular de corrupción
e ineficiencia, deixannos con pouca lexitimidade cara os palestinos.
Un segundo grupo conformanno os mozos da xeración da “primeira Intifada” de 1987-1992, nacidos trala anexión
israelí de Xerusalén Este, Gaza e Cisxordania durante a guerra de 1967. Aquí impoñense
dous homes: Marwan Barghouti e Mohamed Dahlan. O primeiro é considerado polas enquisas, especialmente as
feitas polo Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research en Ramalah, como o líder mais popular entre
os palestinos, despois de Arafat. Barghouti ten 45 anos e unha longa traxectoria dentro de Al Fatah. Nestes momentos,
está preso a perpetuidade en Israel por terrorismo pero a realidade política do momento podería
auspiciar unha forte presión internacional para a súa pronta liberación.
Por contra, Dahlan, de 45 anos, controla os servizos de seguridade de Gaza, pero non conta con moita simpatía
entre os palestinos. En xullo pasado provocou unha rebelión contra Arafat, anque non é segrego que
Dahlan é o candidato preferido por EEUU e Israel. Nembargantes, a pouca popularidade de Dahlan podería
mellorar a “opción Barghouti” e acelerar a súa liberación.
O terceiro grupo de poder está en mans dos chamados “islamistas”, sendo Hamas, Yihad Islámica e Brigadas
de Mártires de Arafat (antes de Al Aqsa), os principais expoñentes. Os tres grupos teñen por
obxectivo crear un estado islámico en Palestina trala destrucción de Israel. Foron os mais activos
na realización de atentados terroristas pero, no caso de Hamás, a súa cúpula relixiosa
foi asasinada este ano tralos ataques selectivos do primeiro ministro israelí, Ariel Sharon.
Deste grupo destaca a potencialidade de Hamás como movemento social capaz de aglutinar o descontento e a
frustración política de milleiros de palestinos. Hamás é o grupo mais popular en Gaza
e pelexa a lexitimidade con Al Fatah en Cisxordania. A pesar de que xa deu sinais de querer contribuir coa transición
e incluso participar nas eleccións de xaneiro, os seus obxectivos futuros aínda son unha incógnita
para moitos palestinos e a propia comunidade internacional.
Dos cambios na transición palestina depende tamén o rol que xoge Israel. O plan de retirada militar
de Gaza imposto unilateralmente por Sharon tivo unha pírrica victoria parlamentaria. O seu goberno atópase
illado internacionalmente, só con apoio de EEUU e Gran Bretaña, socios importantes para a pacificación
en Oriente Medio. Bush e Blair xa se reuniron para impulsar a alicaída Folla de Ruta e hoxe, trala morte
de Arafat, a paradoxa palestina atópase en que o seu futuro decídese mais no exterior que na propia
Palestina. |
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| Índice |
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| 1 |
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“Después
de Arafat”, editorial en La Vanguardia
(España), 15 de novembro de 2004.
La nueva situación entraña
peligros para todos, pese a la coincidencia generalizada de que ahora se abrirán nuevas vías de negociación.
Si el principal obstáculo para la paz era Arafat, como mantenían Bush y Sharon, ahora no cabrían
excusas. Pero, naturalmente, las hay, y no sólo porque la historia sea tozuda. |
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| 2 |
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“Can Arafat's death lead to peace?”, por Paul
Reynolds, en BBC World (Gran Bretaña), 14 de novembro de 2004.
There would be separation between the two
peoples, by means of the barrier, the Palestinians might be able to declare an interim and rump state –which was
in fact supposed to have happened by now under the peace plan known as the roadmap- and the level of violence would
rise and fall deepening on which Palestinian faction gained influence. |
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| 3 |
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“Critical currents: Free Marwan Barghouti”, por Naomi
Chazan, en The Jerusalem Post (Israel), 11 de novembro de 2004.
If indeed elections are held in the near
future to determine the question of succession (and such a ballot is critical for the legitimacy of the future
leadership and for democratic political reform), then the presence of Barghouti´s name on the ballot becomes
imperative. Without him, any outcome would be considered inconclusive and consequently disputed. |
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| 4 |
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“When Arafat's foes inherit”, por Danny
Rubinstein, en Haaretz
(Israel), 15 de novembro de 2004.
It´s fair to assume the opposition
to Abu Mazen and (Mohammed) Dahlan is stronger in Gaza than in the West Bank, since the power struggle within Fatah
is much fiercer there. Yasser Arafat had a balancing efecct on rivals within Fatah in Gaza, and without Arafat
the balance in the Strip is jeopardized and there is danger of increased violence. |
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| 5 |
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“Play it again, Bush and Blair”, por Sam
Bahour e Michael Dahan,
en Arabic
Media Internet Network (Autoridade Palestina),
14 de novembro de 2004.
Unless international and humanitarian law
becomes the key reference point for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it will not really matter who the
Palestinians elect to succeed Yasir Arafat. When the global community, in particular the European Union and UN
Security Council member China, stop supporting US´s desire to find a political cover for what has become
the latest exercise in modern ethnic cleansing, we will be one step closer to peace in the Middle East. |
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| 6 |
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“Après Arafat”, editorial en Le Monde
(Francia), 12 de novembro de 2004.
Beaucoup dépendra de ce qui va se
passer dans les territoires occupés au cours des prochains jours. Une recrudescence de la violence, promise
par les groupes palestiniens les plus extrémistes, comme le Hamas et les Brigades d´Al-Aqsa, et un
durcissement de la répression israélienne, ruinerarient les fragiles chances de reprise au dialogue. |
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| 7 |
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“Can Palestinians go from bullets to ballots?”, en The Economist
(Gran Bretaña), 15 de novembro de 2004.
Thus, although Mr. Abbas has emerged as
the first among equals in the collective Palestinian leadership that has run things since Arafat fell ill, his
chances of victory in the election are far from assured. It is not clear yet whether Fatah will put up any other
candidates. If it does, one highly popular contender would be Marwan Barghouti, a fiery but pragmatic Fatah leader
(...) Another crucial question is whether any of the main Palestinian militant groups will enter the political
proccess and field a presidential candidate –in particular Hamas, whose popularity has risen as the PA´s
has slumped. |
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| 8 |
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“EU:
Europe and the Palestinians after Arafat”,
en Stratfor (EEUU), 12 de novembro de 2004.
Although Arafat has been a symbol of the
Palestinian movement –and wholeheartedly supported by the European Union- the PNA and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) will continue to function without him. The EU, then, will work with Interim PNA President Rawhi
Fattouh, or whomever the Palestinian ultimately select to replace Arafat. To make the transition much easier, the
most likely successors –Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurai or PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas- both have worked
extensively with EU leaders on the peace process. |
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| 9 |
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“Opportunity
for Middle East peace”, por Ahmad J. Majdoubeh, en The Jordan Times
(Xordania), 12 de novembro de 2004.
One answer for what should be done to get
America involved more seriously, however, could come from the European –especially British- side. It is no secret
that the European position towards Mideast peace is more balanced and more reasonable, and ultimately more wiser
and durable, than that of the Americans. Palestinians and Arabs need to play the European card more seriously and
effectively than they have done so far. |
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| 10 |
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“Confronting a new leadership”, editorial en Haaretz (Israel), 11 de novembro de 2004.
Israel must not repeat the mistake it made
last year, when its stinginess in making gestures, combined with Arafat´s stubbornness, hastened the fall
of the Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) government, which wanted to end the conflict. Israel can take steps that will
not harm its security, yet will strengthen the PA´s ability to play an active role in the disengagement plan. |
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| 11 |
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“Arafat's rivals heirs, a field guide”, en Haaretz
(Israel), 12 de novembro de 2004.
The landscape of Palestinian political power,
for four decades in Arafat´s long shadow, is divided into a loose network of camps, some armed, some moneyed,
their leaders quietly circling one other in anticipation of future, struggles for succession. |
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| 12 |
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“The Palestinian priorities”, por Khaled
Dzudar, en Arabic Media Internet Network (Autoridade Nacional Palestina), 10 de novembro de 2004.
Beyond all of that, the most important responsability
for the coming leadership is democracy and democratic processes in Palestinian political life. This is a priority
that has to be dealt with before even thinking of the future relations with Israel and before resuming any peace
talks. |
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| 13 |
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“Is
Israel the next pariah state?”, por Suraya Dadoo,
en The
Palestine Times (Autoridade Nacional Palestina),
novembro de 2004.
Israel is set on a collision course with
the European Union (UE) and could turn into a Pariah State, as South Africa was during the apartheid years, if
it does not resolve the conflict with the Palestinians. According to Israeli Army Radio, this was the main finding
in a confidential 10-year forecast prepared by the Israeli Foreign Ministry´s Centre for Political Research
secreatly released in August. |
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