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En Xeorxia ameaza o caos dende as pasadas eleccións do 2
de novembro, sobre as que medra a sospeita de fraude. A menos de dous anos para completa-lo seu último mandato,
o presidente Shevardnadze vive as súas horas máis baixas en 11 anos de goberno, dende a guerra que
enfrontou a Tiflis coa república autónoma de Adjazia en 1992-93. Animadas polos líderes da
oposición, varias manifestacións se sucederon para reclamar a demisión de Shevardnadze e a
invalidación da victoria pírrica do partido progobernamental Por unha Nova Xeorxia, que, pese encabeza-la
listaxe dos máis votados, vese superado pola maioría de escanos que sumaría a oposición.
O anuncio do traslado de milleiros de soldados á capital aviva, nos últimos días, a posibilidade
dun conflicto civil armado.
Xeorxia ten un papel chave no xogo estratéxico que enfronta ós EEUU e Rusia no Cáucaso. Dende
o ano 2002, os EEUU adestran e instrúen ó Exército xeorxiano cara á súa hipotética
entrada na OTAN. Para Washington, unha estreita alianza con Xeorxia significa poder construí-lo oleoducto
Bakú-Tbilisi-Ceilán, que lle permitirá exportar petróleo do Caspio sen pasar por Rusia
a partir de 2005. Moscova, pola súa banda, mantén as súas tropas nas provincias separatistas
de Abjazia e Osetia do Sur a pesar de que en ningún destes conflictos están involucradas minorías
rusas. Segundo algúns analistas, o apoio de Rusia a estas dúas rexións autónomas xeorxianas,
explícase polo seu interese de dispor de bases militares en Xeorxia.
Tanto Rusia como os EEUU amosaron a súa preocupación pola gravidade da actual situación (as
autoridades xeorxianas acordoaron o complexo presidencial con tropas de Interior) e apelaron ás dúas
partes a resolve-la crise pacificamente. A espera dos resultados definitivos das eleccións, nin Putin nin
Bush retiraron o seu apoio explícito a Eduard Shevardnadze, pero sobre a democracia xeorxiana pesa unha
negra sombra de receo internacional. Non existe aínda unha posición común da Unión
Europea, a pesar de que Xeorxia solicitou o estatuto de candidato o ano 2002. |
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| Índice |
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| 1 |
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“Can Georgia Get Out of Vicious Rut?”, en The Moscow Times,
14 de novembro de 2003.
Shevardnadze's place in history once seemed
assured, after his role as Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign minister in ending the Cold War. While he may view himself
as a tragic King Lear figure, agonizing over the fate of the nation, most Georgians will no doubt remember him
as a corrupt old godfather whose clan bled the country dry. One can only hope that whoever succeeds Shevardnadze
as president –in 2005 or earlier if he steps down– will be remembered in a somewhat more favorable light. |
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| 2 |
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“Unpredictable
Events Unfolding in Georgia”, en Ocnus.net, 16 de novembro de 2003.
'We are providing multi-faceted assistance
to the legitimate government of the country in the establishment of peace in Georgia. We do not want a power equal
to bolshevism and fascism to take control of the government, these are the only words to describe such a power,'
said Abashidze. Abashidze said that if the situation in Georgia gets out of control, the leadership of the country
must take all necessary steps to defend legitimate authority, the people and the constitution of Georgia. |
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| 3 |
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“Loss
of balance”, en The Economist, 8 de novembro de 2003.
In Tbilisi, they say America is too soft
on Mr Shevardnadze, who still commansd respect as one ofthe Soviet Unions´s demolishers. It is, of course,
in the opposition interest to say shuch things. But foreign donors are also frustratedtaht aid money goes astray.
Nobody seems to know how to promote democracy here. |
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“Deploying abashidze, Georgia's president raises
stakes”, en Eurasianet,
14 de novembro de 2003.
By using the autocratic Abashidze as a link
to Russia, Shevardnadze plays a dangerous game. He risks making the opposition look statesmanlike by refusing to
bow to a known strongman. This could make the opposition’s demands all the more uncompromising and further polarize
the situation. Indeed, Saakashvili stated on November 14 that following Abashidze’s involvement, it made "no
sense" to negotiate with Shevardnadze and demanded the president’s resignation. |
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| 5 |
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“Análise: Rússia pode ser arrastada
para conflito na Geórgia”,
de BBC para Folha
Online, 12 de novembro de 2003.
A viagem de Shevardnadze à Ajaria,
aliada à sua conversa com Putin, é um claro sinal de que o presidente da Geórgia está
desesperadamente atrás de apoio. Para Abashidze, apoio significa apoio do Kremlin", disse Giga Bokeria,
da ONG Instituto da Liberdade.Na opinião de Bokeria, ao fazer o jogo russo abertamente, Shevarnadze está
tentando advertir seus desobediente cidadãos e, ao mesmo tempo, enviar uma mensagem aos Estados Unidos e
tentar diminuir a pressão sobre o resultado da eleição. |
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| 6 |
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“La crisis política en Georgia ha ido madurando
desde hace mucho tiempo”, en Offnews.info, 20 de novembro de 2003.
El constante afán de Shevardnadze
de ingresar en la OTAN y su política acentuadamente prooccidental no le valió para nada ni le ayudó
a ganar en popularidad en su propio país. La presencia norteamericana en Georgia, convertida ya en hecho
consumado, no fortaleció las posiciones de Shevardnadze ni en el campo de sus partidarios ni en las filas
de la oposición. |
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| 7 |
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“Caos en Georgia”, por Juan
Carlos Galinso, en La Insignia, 16 de novembro de 2003.
Todo apunta a que si Shevardnadze supera
la crisis, aprovechará la tensión y los enfrentamientos -provocados por el descontento generalizado
pero manipulados después por el Movimiento Nacional- para iniciar una nueva represión contra los
medios de comunicación independientes, oposición y ONG. La constitución prohíbe al
presidente presentarse a las elecciones de 2005. Queda por ver si esta lucha corresponde a un deseo de Shevardnadze
de modificar la constitución y perpetuarse en el poder, maniobra para la que necesitaría la mayoría
en el parlamento. Rusia y Estados Unidos lo verían con buenos ojos. |
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| 8 |
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“Decade of anger engulfs Georgia”, de International Herald Tribune para Minority Web, 14 de novembro de 2003.
The one-word description of him today is
"tired." He has faced rebellions in four provinces, lost control of the breakaway region of Abkhazia
and survived two assassination attempts. He was quoted the other day as saying he had been much happier when he
was foreign minister. |
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| 9 |
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“Chess, poker, or roulette?”, de Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty para Minority Web, 13 de novembro de 2003.
In the wake of the disputed 2 November parliamentary
elections, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze is struggling to prevent control of the legislature passing into
the hands of the Georgian opposition who, he alleges, will "devastate and destroy everything." Whether
he succeeds in doing so will depend primarily on the tactical and strategic skills of both parties, and the cohesion
of the various interest groups currently backing them. |
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| 10 |
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“All
eyes on Georgia's future”, en BBCNews, 16 de agosto de 2003.
Georgia has good reason to be well-disposed
to Uncle Sam. Washington has propped up its fragile independence to the tune of one billion dollars plus. That
makes Georgians the second biggest per capita recipients of US aid after the Israelis. It also gives Washington
an increasing stake - and say - in the political future of the country. |
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| 11 |
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“Vicissitudes of hard times”, en New Times Russia,
outubro 2003.
The Georgian-Abkhazian consultations on
normalizing the situation, despite their seemingly intensive character, have been marking time as before, although
six years have passed since their last temporary result. A statement of the activists of the Aitaira movement says:
“We are sure that the tenth anniversary of Victory will be a milestone in the history of our young state. It is
necessary to exert every effort to make September 30, 2003, the beginning of a new stage in the development of
Abkhazia”. Alas, these words are still far from reality. |
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